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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Ques-
tion of Hong Kong,' the PRC will resume the exercise of sover-
eignty over Hong Kong effective on July 1, 1997. Under the Joint
Declaration, Hong Kong "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy,
except in foreign and defense affairs which are the responsibilities
of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China."' An essential part of this autonomy is the vesting of Hong
Kong "with executive, legislative and independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication." 3 The Declaration also pre-
serves Hong Kong's current social and economic systems.4 Hong
Kong will remain a separate customs territory, it will have an inde-
pendent finance and taxing system, and it will be allowed to "main-
tain and develop economic and cultural relations" on an interna-
* B.S. University of Oregon, 1980; J.D. Boston University School of Law, 1983, for-
mer Assistant Attorney General, Yap, Federated States of Micronesia.
1. A copy of the Joint Declaration is reprinted in 7 Loy. L.A INT'L & COMP. L.J. 141
(1984).
2. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, § 3(2), at 142-43, which states:
(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the au-
thority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy,
except in foreign and defence [sic] affairs which are the responsibilities of the Cen-
tral People's Government.
3. Id. § 3(3), at 143, which states:
(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legisla-
tive and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently
in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.
4. Id. § 3(5), at 143, which states:
(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged,
and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of corre-
spondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious
belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and for-
eign investment will be protected by law.
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tional level. 5
To one degree or another, each of the above characteristics is a
loosening of the traditional binds of sovereignty rather than an as-
sertion. The Declaration on the one hand establishes the PRC's sov-
ereignty over Hong Kong, and on the other hand limits the exercise
of this sovereignty. This act of self-interested benevolence on the
part of the PRC is in a sense a reconfirmation of its power. One
must own something in order to give it away.' And the act of giving
implies that it can be taken back.
The Hong Kong Basic Law, which will serve as a constitution for
Hong Kong and will implement the Joint Declaration, is scheduled
for enactment by the PRC in 1990. The first two drafts of the Basic
Law have revived fears that the PRC does not intend to allow
Hong Kong the full degree of autonomy indicated under the terms
of the Joint Declaration.7 Most alarming, Article 157 of the Basic
Law states: "The power of interpretation of this Law is vested in
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress." Arti-
cle 158 adds: "The power of amendment of this law is vested in the
National People's Congress." Together, these two articles take
away from Hong Kong ultimate control over the content and mean-
ing of the document which is to be the foundation of its separate
existence.
Understandably, there is much concern about the future of Hong
Kong, and more specifically, about how truly autonomous it will be.
No definition of autonomy is contained within the Joint Declara-
tion. Absent a shared understanding of what is meant by autonomy,
the debate on this crucial issue will continue unabated. Thus far, no
effort has been made to look to other similar situations or interna-
5. Id. 3(6), 3(8), and 3(10), at 143-44, which state:
(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a free
port and a separate customs territory.
(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have independent finances.
The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
(10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China," the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations
and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international
organisations.
6. Article 2 of the Hong Kong Draft Basic Law Adopted by NPC (February 24
1989)(hereafter referred to as Basic Law) emphasizes this point through its phraseology of
the autonomy to be enjoyed by Hong Kong: "The NPC authorizes the HKSAR to exercise a
high degree of autonomy . . ." (emphasis added).
7. See generally Hong Kong-Basic Problems of Law, FAR E. ECON. REV. 18 (Aug.
1I, 1988).
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tional law to help define or set a standard for autonomy.8 Perhaps
one reason for this omission is there is no other situation quite like
Hong Kong, where capitalism and socialism are to co-exist as two
systems within one country. Indeed, there appears to be nothing
even close. Another reason for this omission may be that the inter-
national treatment of autonomy in many respects has been less
than clear.9 Despite its indistinct core, however, the parameters of
the concept of autonomy are relatively well defined.
This paper will first explore the concept of autonomy under inter-
national practice and identify whatever norms may exist. The de-
gree of autonomy provided to Hong Kong by the Joint Declaration
and draft Basic Law will then be measured against other examples
of autonomy to assess whether in fact Hong Kong will be accorded
a "high degree" of autonomy. Modifications will be suggested
where appropriate to achieve a level of autonomy commensurate
with comparable situations. Finally, this paper will describe another
recently created political relationship, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands. This comparison will indicate how a
critical issue relating to protection from interference by the central
government was resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.
I. AUTONOMY
"Autonomous areas are regions of a state, usually possessing
some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness, which have been granted
separate powers of internal administration to whatever degree,
without being detached from the state of which they are a part. For
such status to be of present interest, it must be in some way inter-
nationally binding on the central authorities."1 Autonomy is diffi-
cult to define because there exists under international law a whole
continuum of such statuses, ranging from territorial, 1 to free asso-
ciation with citizenship 2 or without citizenship, 3 to protectorates, "
8. See Mushkat, The International Legal Status of Hong Kong Under Post-Transi-
tional Rule, 10 Hous. J. OF INT'L L. 1, 20 (1987). Mushkat briefly mentions international
norms of autonomy as they may apply to Hong Kong.
9. See Hannum & Lilich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, 74 AM. J.
OF INT'L L. 858 (1980).
10. J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-12 (1979).
I1. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Orellana, In Contemplation of Micronesia: The Prospects For
the Decolonization of Puerto Rico Under International Law, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. I (1987). Other territories in this category include Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
the Netherland Antilles.
12. See Clark, Self Determination and Free Association-Should the United Nations
Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust, 21 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 54-60 (1986) (describing the
Cook Islands, where islanders retain New Zealand citizenship and foreign relations are han-
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each with lesser or greater amounts of autonomy." In each in-
stance, the primary entity is vastly more powerful than the second-
ary entity. The degree to which the secondary entity is self-gov-
erning and the amount of control over external affairs possessed by
the primary entity determines where on this continuum the rela-
tionship will be placed. At the near end of this continuum the sec-
ondary entity is completely subsumed within the primary entity. In
the center, the secondary entity enjoys a quasi-sovereign status with
certain limited characteristics of a state under international law. At
the far end, the secondary entity in most respects has full sovereign
status. "Autonomy" in modern usage is generally applied to de-
scribe those entities on the near side of the center of the
continuum. 1"
Significantly, "self-government" means more than just affirma-
tive control over internal affairs. There is also a protective aspect to
this term which assures non-interference by the principal entity
within the sphere of self-government.17 Non-interference is a criti-
cal attribute of autonomy because frequently the secondary entity
obtains its special status as a way of protecting cultural, religious,
died by New Zealand); Broderick, Associated Statehood-A New Form of Decolonization,
17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 368 (1968).
13. See Macdonald, Termination of the Strategic Trusteeship: Free Association, the
United Nations and International Law, 7 BROOKLYN J. OF INT'L L. 235 (1981) (Microne-
sians form new nations with their own citizenship and power to conduct foreign relations,
while the United States controls security and defense).
14. See, e.g., B. GILSON, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY 383-86 (1984) (two sovereign states
agree by treaty for the stronger one to provide military protection and perhaps other aid, and
manage major aspects of international relations, i.e., the relationship between France and
Morocco).
15. Using a broad sense of the term autonomy, even states within a federal union
would qualify for consideration. In practice confederacies are excluded because the relation-
ship between such states is one of co-equal entities. The points identified on the continuum
are merely points. Many variations and gradations exist between these points. In a compre-
hensive survey published in 1919, the following types were identified: semi-sovereign states,
protected independent states, guaranteed states, neutralized states, vassal states, protected
dependent states, administered provinces, autonomous colonies and dependencies, members
of federal union and confederacy. 'See W. WILLOUGHBY & C. FENWICK, TYPES OF RE-
STRICTED SOVEREIGNTY AND OF COLONIAL AUTONOMY (1919).
16. See Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute, The Theory and Practice of
Government Autonomy (Final Report of the Dept. of State 1980)("PAIL Report") at 3.
Autonomy is generally understood to refer to independence of action on the internal or do-
mestic level, as foreign relations and defense are normally in the hands of the central or
principal government, but some power to conclude international agreements concerning eco-
nomic or cultural matters also may reside with the autonomous government. See also L.
BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 72 (1973).
17. MODELS OF AUTONOMY 5 (Y. Dinstein ed. 1981), "The concept of self-government
implies that for important political or economic reasons a particular area will remain within
the territorial jurisdiction of another political entity but will possess political freedom to
regulate certain of its own affairs without any interference by that entity."
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ethnic, language, or other institutions, from the overwhelming ma-
jority of the primary entity." "They are interested in excluding
State and majority interference as far as their specific background,
tradition and way of life are concerned. Because a certain group is,
and feels, different from the majority of the population, it longs for
different rights."' 9
Another attribute of autonomy is that it is "often granted and
guaranteed by treaty under international law."2 Autonomous re-
gions created by treaty consequently enjoy an internationally sanc-
tioned assurance of their status. The significance of this aspect of
autonomy depends on the viability of enforcement, which varies
greatly. At the very least, the fact that the relationship comes
under international purview implies that the central government
does not have an unfettered right to unilaterally alter the nature of
the relationship.
A comprehensive survey of autonomous entities was conducted in
1980 for the United States Department of State by the Procedural
Aspects of International Law Institute (PAIL). 21 The PAIL Report
categorized these entities into four groups: federal states, interna-
tionalized territories, associated states, and miscellaneous.2 2 Auton-
omy in the modern sense, as defined in preceding paragraphs, ap-
plies primarily to the associated states category, and therefore only
this category will be discussed. 23 This category covers the Cook Is-
lands, Niue, Tokelau, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Trust Territories of
the Pacific Islands, Netherland Antilles, and non-self governing ter-
ritories under the United Nations in general. 2 The PAIL Report
examined the allocation of power between the primary state and
18. Id. at 26.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. PAIL Report, supra note 16.
22. "Federal states" are equal entities joined in a union. "Internationalized territories"
are entities created under international supervision in response to political considerations.
"Associated states" are those relatively recent territories which have entered into a primary
state-secondary state relationship. The miscellaneous category encompasses several idiosyn-
cratic situations. See Hannum, supra note 9, at 859-60 n.ll, 12, 13, 14.
23. Most of the entities examined in the other three categories are useful as historical
models of autonomy, and generally do not fit well within the model of autonomy described
earlier. However, several of the entities in the federal states category have isolated character-
istics which do qualify for consideration. This overlap occurs because the categorization is
somewhat arbitrary, as the authors of the Report admit. Id. at 859. A separate reason for
not including the federal states in the comparison is the PRC's insistence that it is a unitary
state and does not have a federal system. See Jianfan, Several Issues Concerning the Rela-
tionship Between the Central Government of the People's Republic of China and the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, 2 J. OF CHIN. L. 65, 73-74 (1988).
24. Hannum, supra note 9, at 859-60 n.13.
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secondary state in relation to executive, legislative, and judicial
authority.
Four of the six associated states select their own Chief Execu-
tive.25 Police powers are held locally in all but one of the associated
states.26 In all of these states, except for one, the primary or central
government has virtually complete authority over foreign relations
and defense.2 7
All but one of the associated states has a locally elected legisla-
tive body.2 In half of the states residual power rests with the cen-
tral government.29 Also, in half of the states, the central govern-
ment has veto power over local legislation. However, in two of the
three cases where such power exists, the primary government right
to veto was either limited or had never been exercised. 30 With re-
gard to the right of the secondary entity to amend its own constitu-
tion, three states have the right and three do not.3 ' There is a
strong correlation between these three categories. Those areas with
control over their constitution also tend to possess residual legisla-
tive power and are not subject to veto by the central government.32
"A free and independent judiciary forms a part of the govern-
mental structure of all the politically autonomous entities surveyed.
However, this independence does not necessarily imply total separa-
tion from the central sovereign judicial authorities. 33 Members of
the highest local court in four out of five of the associated states are
selected by the central government.34 In four out of five of the asso-
ciated states appeals on local matters are allowed to the central
25. PAIL Report, supra note 16, at 11-12.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Trust Territories, upon termination of the Trust, will have authority over
foreign relations, while the United States controls defense matters.
28. Id. at 19. The exception is Tokelau.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 19-20.
31. Id. The PAIL Report concluded that, "if there is a determining factor in many of
these cases, it seems to be whether the autonomous entity was an independent state (nation)
prior to the creation of the new relationship in concert with another state." Id. at 15-16.
Those entities which were independent retain greater residual government powers than those
which were not.
32. Id. at 16-19.
33. Hannum, supra note 9, at 869.
34. PAIL Report, supra note 16, at 26. Only five states were included in this category
because at the time the Report was drafted the future relationship of the Trust Territories in
this regard had not been finalized. Under the terms of the Compact of Free Association now
in effect, the local entities appoint their own judges, no appeals are allowed to the U.S., and
ultimate constitutional jurisdiction (excluding cases involving the Compact itself) remains
with the local high court.
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government.35 And in all five cases ultimate constitutional jurisdic-
tion is vested in the central government. 36 "[I]n questions concern-
ing the constitutionality of local actions or the relationship between
the autonomous and principal governments, decisions of the local
court, when they can exercise original jurisdiction, can generally be
appealed to a higher court responsible to the central government
authorities. 37
Several conclusions can be drawn from the PAIL Report. Mod-
ern forms of autonomous entities enjoy more executive and legisla-
tive independence than judicial.38 The independence they do possess
uniformly relates to internal matters. Constitutional independence,
as a combined legislative and judicial matter, does not exist.39 In-
formation from the Report verifies the statement made earlier
about the concept of autonomy; it is muddled at its core but rela-
tively clear at the outer boundaries. To the extent that a pattern of
practice establishes a standard meaning of autonomy under inter-
national law, the foregoing information provides a basis for evaluat-
ing the concerns raised regarding the future status of Hong Kong.
II. HONG KONG
Post-1997 Hong Kong easily satisfies the descriptive criteria of
an autonomous entity under international law. The Joint Declara-
tion is an international agreement which creates and guarantees
Hong Kong's special status, preserving its right of self-government.
The Basic Law will serve as the document which sets forth Hong
Kong's internal "constitutional" structure as an entity distinct from
the PRC. The purpose of the arrangement is to maintain Hong
Kong's separate nature and to insure that it is not overwhelmed by
the PRC. Hong Kong's political and economic institutions will be
preserved for at least fifty years, insulated from the PRC's very
different systems. It cannot be disputed that the Joint Declaration
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 25.
38. A review of the PAIL Report also indicates that no clear distinction emerges as
between the federal states and associated states categories with regard to executive and legis-
lative power. On the allocation of judicial power, the federal states are more independent,
though not considerably so. In most instances, ultimate constitutional jurisdiction remains
with the central government. Id. at 26.
39. This generalization is not correct when applied to the Federated States of Micro-
nesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, created after the PAIL Report was com-
pleted. Both are fully independent with regard to their own constitution, although they are
constrained by the terms of the Compact.
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and the draft Basic Law provide Hong Kong with a substantial de-
gree of autonomy; the argument is over the amount of autonomy.
Whether the degree of autonomy now contemplated is enough can
be measured against the survey of autonomous entities and the rea-
sons for creating such entities.
A. Executive
Under the Joint Declaration, the Chief Executive is to be ap-
pointed by the PRC based on the results of local elections or con-
sultations. 0 The draft Basic Law sets out three different methods
for selection of the Chief Executive: the first Chief Executive will
be recommended by an Election Committee (whose members are
elected by various designated sectors of the Hong Kong populace)
following a method yet undetermined; the second and third Chief
Executives will be nominated by the Election Committee and
elected by the Committee following a secret ballot; the method of
selection for later Chief Executives will be determined by the third
Legislative Council.4 Police powers are vested in the Executive.42
Foreign affairs and defense matters are the responsibility of the
PRC,' 3 though Hong Kong may maintain foreign relations in a few
areas, including business, culture, and sports.""
Most autonomous entities select their Chief Executive without
participation by the central government. Through its appointment
power the PRC has ultimate control over who becomes Chief Exec-
utive, even if the person is selected by a democratic power. Insofar
as the appointment power implies that approval can be withheld at
will by the PRC, Hong Kong has less independence than other au-
tonomous entities. If the appointment power is wielded by the PRC
with no restrictive guidelines or justification, the primary allegiance
of the Chief Executive will inevitably be directed toward the PRC
rather than Hong Kong. 5 A provision in the Basic Law which
40. Joint Delaration, sec. 3(4) supra note 1, at 144. This same provision gives the
PRC appointment power over the principal officials of the executive office, upon nomination
by the Chief Executive.
41. Basic Law, Annex I and Annex 2.
42. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, § 3(11 )(maintenance of public order is the respon-
sibility of Hong Kong SAR); Basic Law, art. 63 ("The prosecuting authority of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall institute criminal prosecutions independently, free
from any interference.").
43. Joint Declaration, supra note 2, § 3(2).
44. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex 1, § XI, arts. 149-56.
45. See The Law Takes Shape, FAR E. ECON. REV. (December 18, 1986)(discussing
Chief Executive accountability to the PRC).
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makes the Chief Executive "accountable" to the PRC46 removes
any doubt about the PRC's intention to strictly control Hong
Kong's titular head. A Hong Kong Chief Executive with divided
loyalties may also compromise the independence of the legislative
and judicial branches. The Chief Executive has the power to dis-
solve the legislature,47 and appoints the members of the court.48
Self-government simply cannot be achieved when the head of the
secondary entity is beholden to the central government. 9
Objections to the draft Basic Law have not focused on this prob-
lem, presumably because the PRC's appointment power was in-
cluded in the Joint Declaration. Nevertheless, since the Basic Law
is intended to implement the terms of the Joint Declaration, omis-
sion of a necessary provision is as significant as inclusion of an im-
proper provision. For self-government to be a reality, a paragraph
should be added to the Basic Law to the effect that:
The PRC shall appoint the person selected by election unless by
clear and convincing evidence the PRC determines that the per-
son selected is not fit to hold office. The determination of fitness
shall be made in good faith, and is limited to finding of mental or
physical incapacity or lack of moral integrity suitable for the of-
fice. No person shall be found unfit solely on the basis of ex-
pressed policies or opinions.
True autonomy will exist only if the power to withhold approval is
strictly circumscribed in the fashion described above. This proposed
restriction is consistent with modern forms of autonomy and with
the Joint Declaration's promised high degree of autonomy.
B. Legislative
Annex 1 to the Joint Declaration provides that Hong Kong shall
have its own legislature, to be constituted by elections.50 The legis-
lature has the power to enact laws not inconsistent with the Basic
46. Basic Law, art. 43.
47. Id. art. 50, Hong Kong.
48. Id. art. 48(6) and 87; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex 1, art. 11, at 146-47.
49. See Red Cards on the Table, FAR E. ECON. REV. 21-22 (July 7, 1988)("Quoting
from comments made by China's supreme leader Deng Xiaoping in 1984, Zhang said the
criteria for determining who would rule Hong Kong was that such people must be
patriotic.").
50. Supra note 1. See also Basic Law art. 67. Allowing local elections is in some
respects a remarkable concession by the PRC, considering that at the time the Joint Declara-
tion was drafted Hong Kong's Legislative Council was made up entirely of appointed mem-
bers. See generally N. MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 126-90
(1981).
1989]
9
Tamanaha: Post-1997 Hong Kong: A Comparative Study of the Meaning of "High
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Law.5 A provision in the draft Basic Law gives the PRC authority
to invalidate any law "regarding affairs within the responsibility of
the Central Authorities or the relationship between the Central Au-
thorities and the region" which it determines to not be in conform-
ity with the Basic Law.52 A separate article acknowledges the PRC
power to enact laws which apply in Hong Kong. 53 There is no clear
indication in the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law regarding
residual legislative power. The legislature may propose amendments
to the Basic Law, but the power to amend is vested exclusively in
the PRC's National People's Congress.54 In addition, the draft Ba-
sic Law imposes the requirement that "No amendment to this [Ba-
sic Law] shall contravene the established basic policies of the PRC
regarding Hong Kong."
As indicated earlier, the survey showed that the more autono-
mous of associated states share the characteristics of (1) possessing
the power to amend their own constitution without approval of the
central government, (2) holding residual legislative power, and (3)
not being subject to veto of legislation by the central government.
Even those entities with less autonomy generally possess at least
one of these characteristics. 55 Yet, Hong Kong appears to be de-
prived of all three. Using international practice as a standard, in
the legislative area Hong Kong clearly does not enjoy a "high de-
gree" of autonomy.
The PRC may respond that these issues were settled in the Joint
Declaration. Such an argument would have some merit. The Joint
Declaration gives the PRC the power to "enact and promulgate"
the Basic Law. 56 In effect, the Basic Law will be a statute of the
PRC. An obvious alternative would have been for the residents of
Hong Kong, through a convention and referendum, to draft and
adopt the Basic Law." With the power to create goes the power to
51. Joint Declaration, Annex 1; Basic Law, art. 72(l).
52. Basic Law, art. 17.
53. Id. art. 18.
54. Id. art. 158. For a proposed amendment from Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region to even qualify for consideration, it must first obtain the "consent of two-thirds of the
deputies of the Region to the National People's Congress, two-thirds of all the members of
the legislature of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region." Id.
55. See PAIL Report, supra note 15, at 19-20. Tokelau and Guam, the least autono-
mous of all the associated states, were the only areas to lack all three characteristics, and in
Guam the central government veto power had never been exercised.
56. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex 1, art. 1, at 145.
57. This would also have meant that some degree of self-determination would be ac-
corded to the people of Hong Kong. See generally Amber, Self-Determination in Hong
Kong: A New Challenge to an Old Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839 (1985).
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amend. The PRC was given the former power by the Joint Declara-
tion and the latter naturally, though not inevitably, follows there-
from. Nevertheless, no justification exists for the added substantive
limitation on amendments-consistency with PRC policies. "Poli-
cies" are by nature vague and transitory. Moreover, this provision
potentially conflicts with the Joint Declaration's assurance that "so-
cialist policies shall not be practised" in Hong Kong.58 The only
limitations on the Basic Law anticipated by the Joint Declaration
are the Joint Declaration itself and the PRC Constitution.59
There is less support for the PRC on the issue of the power to
declare legislation invalid. The Joint Declaration requires that all
Hong Kong laws be reported to the PRC Standing Committee, af-
ter which it adds: "Laws enacted by the legislature which are in
accordance with the Basic Law and legal procedures shall be re-
garded as valid."6 0 Apparently, the PRC interprets this sentence to
vest in the Standing Committee the right to invalidate laws. How-
ever, an equally plausible alternative, and one more consistent with
other entities granted a high degree of autonomy, would be for the
judiciary of Hong Kong to decide whether legislation is consistent
with the Basic Law and legal procedures. 1
Of particular concern from the standpoint of autonomy is the
PRC's assertion of power to enact legislation applicable in Hong
Kong. The Basic Law provision asserting this power is circular and
ambiguous, extending to laws "relating to defence and foreign af-
fairs as well as other laws outside the limits of the autonomy of the
region as specified by this Law."6 " But the autonomy granted to
Hong Kong by the Joint Declaration is phrased in the negative-it
encompasses everything not related to defense and foreign affairs.6 3
The wording of this Basic Law provision expands PRC authority in
58. Joint Declaration, Annex 1, art. 1. In any event, as the draft now reads this limita-
tion is superfluous; considering that the PRC controls the amending process, it is unlikely
that any successful amendment will contravene PRC policies regarding Hong Kong.
59. Joint Declaration, Annex I, art. I.
60. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex I, art. II, at 146-47.
61. See generally Davis, A Common Court in a Marxist Country: the Case for Judi-
cial Review in the Hong Kong SAR, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. I (1987). But see Chu,
Interpretation and Review of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion, 2 J. OF CHIN. L. 49, 55-56 (1988)(arguing that if Hong Kong SAR judiciary is given
power of final adjudication over constitutionality of SAR legislation, it would amount to
power over the central government).
62. Basic Law, art. 18.
63. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex 1, art. I, at 146. "Except for foreign and
defence affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and indepen-
dent judicial power, including that of final adjudication."
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violation of the very limits of autonomy the Basic Law is supposed
to preserve. The very power to impose legislation on Hong Kong is
itself a limitation on autonomy."' Since the division of authority in
the Joint Declaration is phrased as a limitation on the PRC's
power, the PRC's power to legislate over the area is limited, and all
those powers not explicitly provided to the PRC should vest with
Hong Kong.
Clearly, measured against models of autonomy, Hong Kong does
not have a high degree of autonomy in the allocation of legislative
power. On this score, the PRC has violated one of the most basic
premises underlying the principle of autonomy: freedom from inter-
ference by the central government. 5
C. Judicial
Judges are appointed by the Chief Executive with the endorse-
ment of the legislature."' The Joint Declaration provides that Hong
Kong shall have "independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication," 7 free from any intcrference.6 8 Hong Kong courts
will have jurisdiction "over all cases in the region," except those
relating to executive acts of the PRC. 9 Whenever such questions
arise in the context of a given case, the courts are required to seek
the advice of the Chief Executive, and are bound by the response
provided.70 In turn, the Chief Executive must "obtain a certificate"
64. The Joint Declaration lists the laws to apply in Hong Kong SAR as the Basic Law,
laws previously in force, and laws enacted by the Hong Kong SAR legislature. Joint Decla-
ration, supra note 1, Annex 1, Part I1. By omission, this may be interpreted to exclude PRC
laws.
65. But see Jianfan, supra note 23, at 74-80 (arguing that it is proper for the PRC to
review laws and for national laws to apply).
66. Joint Declaration, supra note I, Annex I, art. II, at 146-47; Basic Law, art. 87.
67. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, § 3(l); Basic Law, art. 19.
68. Joint Declaration, Annex I, art. IlI, at 147-48; Basic Law, art. 84.
69. Basic Law, supra note 41, art. 18.
70. Id. Article 19 is far too sketchy in regard to the approach to be followed in deter-
mining jurisdiction when acts of state are at issue:
Courts of the HKSAR shall have no jurisdiction over cases relating to the acts of
state. Courts of the region shall obtain a statement from the Chief Executive on
questions concerning the facts [sic] of state whenever such questions arise in any
legal proceeding .. "
The ambiguity rests in the distinction between a case an issue within a case. There is no
concrete way to distinguish when a case "relates" to an act of state from when a "question
concerning" an act of state arises in a case. This difficulty is further complicated because a
determination of jurisdiction must be made at the outset. The Basic Law does not indicate
whether a case that later turns out to "relate" to an act of state will be divested from the
court or will be declared null if the case has already been completed, nor does it indicate who
is to make this determination. These are serious questions which must be addressed.
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from the PCR prior to issuing the requested statement.7' Power to
interpret the Basic Law is vested in the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress. 2 In the course of adjudicating a case,
the court may interpret the Basic Law. 7" However, where an inter-
pretation of the Basic Law would concern matters of defense, for-
eign affairs, or other affairs which are the responsibility of the
PRC, prior to rendering a final judgment, the court must seek an
interpretation from the Standing Committee. 4
It is difficult to compare the degree of judicial autonomy pro-
vided to Hong Kong against the PAIL survey of autonomous enti-
ties because the categories of power are not parallel. The survey
indicated that in most autonomous entities, the central government
selects members of the highest court, appeals are allowed to the
central government on local matters, and the central government
has ultimate constitutional jurisdiction. Hong Kong judges are se-
lected by the local Chief Executive, the Hong Kong court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction in local cases with the power of final adjudica-
tion, and no appeal may be taken to the central government.7 5
Superficially, it would seem that Hong Kong has greater judicial
autonomy than the norm. In some respects it does have more auton-
omy, but in important respects it does not.
Although judges in Hong Kong are selected locally by the Chief
Executive, selection of the Hong Kong Chief Executive, unlike most
autonomous entities, is approved by the central government. Thus,
the central government's control over the selection of judges exists
through its control over the Chief Executive.
Comparison of the power of adjudication is more subtle. The Ba-
sic Law divides two ordinarily linked aspects of judicial
power-interpretation and application-allocating the former to
the PRC and the latter to Hong Kong. The PRC's power of inter-
71. Basic Law, Article 19.
72. Basic Law, art. 157. Standing Committee interpretations will not overturn any
judgment previously rendered.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Basic Law, art. 87. Similar to the provision for election of the legislature, granting
to Hong Kong SAR the power of final adjudication is arguably more than it possessed under
British rule. See Jianfan, supra note 23, at 71 ("Presently, the Hong Kong courts are not
vested with the power of final adjudication. The court of final adjudication is the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council... When compared to the present situation, this provision
will greatly increase the judicial power vested in the Hong Kong SAR."). But see Breach of
Promise, FAR E. ECON. REV. 34 (May 12, 1988)("This clause could be said to be a breach of
the 1984 accord because China's legislature would have the power to interpret the post-1997
constitution, whereas it is the Hong Kong courts which now interpret the Letters Patent and
the Royal Instruction, under which the British have governed the colony since 1842.").
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pretation is further bolstered by mandatory certification. Although
Hong Kong courts have the power of final adjudication, in a given
case this power is severely undercut by the fact that the court is
required to certify certain issues involving the PRC and the Basic
Law to the Chief Executive or the PRC Standing Committee, and
must adhere to the answer provided. This mandatory certification
procedure threatens the court's independence both within the au-
tonomous region, because it must follow the dictates of the execu-
tive branch on an interpretation of law, and in relation to the PRC,
because it must follow the dictates of a political organization of the
central government. Both paths lead directly back to the PRC.
Mandatory certification is potentially more disruptive to judicial
independence than taking an appeal from a final decision. Cases
will literally be interrupted and delayed pending an answer. Silence
in the Basic Law on who will decide when a certification is neces-
sary raises further questions. If the PRC claims the power to de-
cide, it may halt a case in mid-course or, more likely, it may ex
post declare a decision void where it decides certification "should
have" occurred but did not. The latter approach would render
empty the court's power of final adjudication. Consistent with au-
tonomy, two companion restrictions on the certification procedure
must be explicitly added to the Basic Law: 1) the Hong Kong court
alone will decide in a given case when certification is necessary, 2)
certification is necessary only when the issue certified is "material,"
that is, will effect the outcome of the case. In addition, to restore
internal balance between the branches, certification to the Chief
Executive should be abolished.
The above restrictions are consistent with the PRC's separation
between application and interpretation, as both are within the
sphere of application. These are not mutually exclusive categories
and there may be some overlap. Although Hong Kong partisans
may disagree, the division between application and interpretation,
with the PRC taking the latter power, is not inconceivable under
constitutional theory and does not of itself infringe upon the power
of final adjudication.
The survey of autonomous entities lends support to the PRC's
claim of power to interpret the Basic Law on certain issues. In vir-
tually all of the autonomous entities, the central government has
final jurisdiction, whether appellate or original, for judicial deci-
sions regarding the relationship between it and the secondary en-
tity, and exclusively controls decisions relating to its power over
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foreign affairs and defense matters. The PRC's power of interpreta-
tion, which operates as a substitute mechanism of control since it
has no appellate jurisdiction, is therefore consistent with general
practice. It would also be consistent with general practice, however,
to limit the PRC's power to interpret the Basic Law to those ques-
tions regarding the relationship between Hong Kong and the PRC,
and those questions regarding foreign affairs and defense. This lim-
itation should be explicitly included in the Basic Law. Accordingly,
interpretations of the Basic Law dealing solely with internal mat-
ters should remain with the Hong Kong judiciary. Again, there is
the issue of who will decide. Since these questions inevitably will
intrude upon the PRC's area of authority, the PRC should ulti-
mately decide whether a given interpretation is internal only or af-
fects the relationship between the PRC and Hong Kong.
Judicial autonomy is often examined at only one level. This anal-
ysis suggests that two different levels exist within the PRC's dis-
tinction between interpretation and application. These two levels
are institutional autonomy on the application level and substantive
autonomy on the interpretation level. Institutional autonomy covers
the independence of the court, and freedom from mandatory certifi-
cation except in restricted circumstances necessary to preserve com-
pelling interests of the PRC. Substantive autonomy covers the sub-
ject areas carved out for Hong Kong alone to control, internal self-
government with exclusive and final say on anything other than for-
eign affairs or defense. The PRC may act to control its legitimate
interests outside these areas of institutional and substantive auton-
omy, even if such actions include final interpretation of certain pro-
visions of the Basic Law and restricted mandatory certification of
questions. The principle of non-interference underlying all autono-
mous entities, and promised in the Joint Declaration, supports this
proposed distribution of power.
Much of the concern about the draft Basic Law focuses on the
Standing Committee's power to interpret the Basic Law. Unques-
tionably, this is a valid concern, though the power does not inevita-
bly threaten the judiciary's right of final adjudication. Of greater
concern should be the Standing Committee's power to amend the
Basic Law. Assuming, arguendo, Hong Kong courts are given final
say over interpretation of the Basic Law, if the PRC does not like a
particular interpretation it can simply amend the law to circumvent
the interpretation.
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D. Basic Law Committee
The draft Basic Law creates an entity with the ponderous title
Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the Standing
Committee of the NPC (Basic Law Committee),7" and vests this
entity with potentially extraordinary power. This Committee is to
be comprised of twelve members appointed by the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC, six members from Hong Kong and six from the
mainland.77 Pursuant to Article 17 of the Basic Law, the Standing
Committee must consult the Basic Law Committee before it con-
cludes that a law enacted by the Hong Kong legislature is invalid. 71
Likewise, under Article 18 the Basic Law Committee must be con-
sulted when the Standing Committee decides which national laws
are to apply to Hong Kong. 79 The Basic Law Committee must also
be consulted before the Standing Committee issues an interpreta-
tion of the Basic Law.80 Finally, the Basic Law Committee must
submit its views on all proposed amendments to the Basic Law.81
On the surface the Basic Law Committee appears to possess no
real power, limited as it is to a body for consultation. It can even be
argued that the existence of the Committee benefits Hong Kong
because it is comprised in half by persons from Hong Kong, pre-
sumably to insure that the voice of Hong Kong will be heard. Yet,
this body, made permanent and institutionalized in the Basic Law,
poses a threat to the autonomy of Hong Kong. Over time there will
unavoidably be an accumulation of power if a single group is con-
sulted on so many essential issues relating to legislative and judicial
acts of both the Hong Kong and National governments. If the Ba-
sic Law Committee, its membership controlled by the PRC, is de-
ferred to with any regularity, it will in effect become a supra-legis-
lature and supra-judiciary for Hong Kong. The only purpose the
Basic Law Committee can serve is as a legitimizing mechanism for
the Standing Committee when imposing its will contrary to the will
of the government of Hong Kong. The views of Hong Kong can be
better represented when directly solicited from the affected branch
76. Basic Law, Annex Ill, Proposal by the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of
the HKSAR on the Establishment of the Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR of
the Standing Committee of the NPC.
77. The Hong Kong members are to be nominated jointly by the Chief Executive, the
President of the Legislative Council, and the Chief Justice of the final appellate court. Mem-
bers are appointed for five year terms. Id. at paragraph 4.
78. Basic Law, Article 17.
79. Basic Law, Article 18.
80. Basic Law, Article 157.
81. Basic Law, Article 158.
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or branches of government. If the Standing Committee wishes to
create an internal advisory body which specializes on questions re-
lating to Hong Kong, it can do so on its own without express incor-
poration in the Basic Law.
E. Findings
Hong Kong, under the Joint Declaration and draft Basic Law,
will be an autonomous entity as the term is understood under pre-
vailing norms of international law. On a comparative scale, how-
ever, post-1997 Hong Kong cannot be said to possess a "high de-
gree of autonomy." As the preceding sections indicate, Hong
Kong's anticipated executive, legislative, and judicial independence
will be significantly restricted, and in many respects more so than
other autonomous entities. This observation, though correct, may
not be entirely fair to the PRC. The degree of autonomy intended
cannot be taken out of the context provided by the Joint Declara-
tion. The Joint Declaration is the international agreement that de-
fines the relationship. It gives the PRC control over two significant
aspects of the relationship: appointment of the Chief Executive and
promulgation of the Basic Law which is equivalent to the "constitu-
tion" of Hong Kong. 2 Thus, at the outset, Hong Kong had less
autonomy than other similar arrangements.
Nevertheless, it seems fair to conclude that, within the con-
straints of this initial allocation and the substantive reservation of
power over foreign affairs and defense to the PRC, a "high degree
of autonomy" means that all other allocations of authority should
favor the independence of Hong Kong. This guiding principle is
consistent with the language and spirit of the Joint Declaration,
and the expressed intent of the PRC prior to its drafting: "We
guarantee that absolutely nothing will change in Hong Kong. The
freedoms, the systems and your way of life will be preserved."8 3
From a functional standpoint, favoring Hong Kong independence is
a necessity. The concept underlying Hong Kong's autonomous sta-
82. A PRC representative on the Basic Law drafting Committee convincingly argues
that the Basic Law should not be considered a "mini-constitution," but rather is merely
statutory law of the PRC. Youyu, The Reasons For and Basic Principles in Formulating the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law and its Essential Contents and Mode
of Expression, 2 J. OF CHIN. L. 5, 7-8 (1988). On the relationship between the Basic Law
and the PRC Constitution, see generally Chen, Further Aspects of the Autonomy of Hong
Kong Under the PRC Constitution, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 341 (1984) and Clarke, Hong Kong
Under the Chinese Constitution, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 71 (1984).
83. This Year, Next Year, FAR E. EcON. REV. 11-12 (July 7, 1983) (statement of
Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Xi Zhongxun).
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tus, and indeed, underlying all autonomous entities, is non-interfer-
ence from the central government. More particularly, autonomy is
necessary to preserve Hong Kong's thriving economy. Outsiders, as
well as the people of Hong Kong, must be assured that Hong Kong
will be stable and will be insulated, in a real way, from the socialist
system.
Consistent with the foregoing, the PRC should consider imple-
menting the following suggested changes to the Basic Law:
1) automatic appointment of Chief Executive, unless determined
unfit for non-political reasons;
2) elimination of PRC power to declare invalid Hong Kong SAR
legislation, except for those that directly conflict with Basic Law
provisions on foreign affairs and defense, and the Hong Kong/
PRC relationship;
3) elimination of the provision requiring that amendments to the
Basic Law be consistent with PRC policies regarding HK;
4) explicitly giving residual legislative power to Hong Kong SAR,
and limiting PRC power to enact legislation applicable to Hong
Kong SAR;
5) limiting mandatory certification to "material" questions, and
letting Hong Kong courts decide when certification is necessary;
6) elimination of Standing Committee power to interpret Basic
Law on issues other than foreign affairs and defense, and the
Hong Kong/PRC relationship.
7) elimination of the provisions regarding the Basic Law
Committee.
Each of these suggestions will have the effect of making Hong
Kong more autonomous, and more consistent with the constraints
of the Joint Declaration and the intent of the parties. A number of
compromises are involved, but clearly the PRC will be called upon
to exercise greater restraint than it currently manifests in the draft
Basic Law. Whether the PRC would be willing to do so is more a
question of politics and bargaining power than law. Following the
June 4 massacre in Peking Hong Kong residents view with icreas-
ing skepticism the value of the Basic Law as an effective restraint
on the PRC.84 China must take concrete actions to convince Hong
Kong that it intends to abide by the spirit of the Joint Declaration's
84. See Far. E. Econ. Rev. 26 (October 12, 1989)("Since the 4 June massacre in Pe-
king, emigration has been the hottest and almost the only topic in town. Very few people
bother to discuss the draft Basic Law, which will serve as a mini-constitution for Hong Kong
after 1997."); Far E. Econ. Rev. 20, 21 (July 20, 1989)(". . . in the wake of the massacre,
people have woken up to the flimsy nature of the Joint Declaration, the hollowness of British
and Chinese promises and the lack of mechanisms to enforce compliance.").
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assurance of autonomy for the region. Hong Kong should be able to
draw upon other models of autonomy and the standards set by
these models to argue persuasively that the above changes are nec-
essary to insure true self-government for Hong Kong.
Noticeably absent from this list is the PRC's power to amend the
Basic Law, which is arguably the most important aspect of the allo-
cation of power. This has been set apart because it is also the most
difficult issue to resolve equitably. It is the point at which the
PRC's power to enact and amend laws as a sovereign nation di-
rectly conflicts with Hong Kong's need to be free from interference.
Fortunately, on this very point there is a parallel model of auton-
omy which is of value.
III. COMMONWEALTH OF NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
(CNMI)
The Marianas are a group of islands in the Western Pacific, situ-
ated within Micronesia. Following World War 11 the United States
administered the islands of Micronesia pursuant to a strategic trus-
teeship created by the United Nations, known as the Trust Terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands.8" The trusteeship was created for the
protection of non-self governing territories, to promote-the indepen-
dence and advancement of the inhabitants, and to maintain inter-
national security. 86 Beginning in 1969 the United States negotiated
with representatives from each of the island groups of the Trust
Territories to arrange for a new status.8s The ultimate goal of the
new status was termination of the Trust.88 In the course of these
discussions the islands divided into four entities. Three chose the
status of free association with the United States,89 and the fourth,
the Northern Mariana Islands, opted to join political union with
the United States as a Commonwealth.
For a variety of reasons, the Northern Marianas desired a close
relationship with the United States, in contrast to the other three
85. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947,
61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189.
86. See generally Note, Self-Determination and the Security in the Pacific, 9 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 277, 279-82 (1976).
87. See generally Clark, supra note 12.
88. Substantial criticism has been directed at the United States for the way it handled
the Trust Territories. See, e.g., D. MCHENRY, MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED (1975);
Mink, Our Bungled Trust, 6 TEX. INT'L L.J. 181 (1971).
89. These three entities are the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Is-
lands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. See generally The Compact of Free Associa-
tion: An End to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 213 (1987).
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entities, which preferred a more independent status. Negotiations
resulted in the drafting of the "Covenant to Establish a Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States" (Covenant)." Inhabitants of the Mariana Islands
approved the Covenant by a vote of 78% in a United Nations ap-
proved plebiscite held in mid-1975.9 1 The Covenant was then en-
acted into law by the United States Congress and signed by Presi-
dent Ford."2
The Covenant, which sets forth the basic nature of the relation-
ship between the United States and the Marianas, is not a treaty or
international agreement. It has been described as a "federal rela-
tions act with certain international aspects to it."'93 Under the Cov-
enant, CNMI exercises "local self-government excepting the han-
dling of foreign relations and military affairs." '94 The United States
is sovereign over the area and residents are entitled to United
States citizenship. 5 The CNMI remains outside the U.S. customs
territory, it controls immigration, and it may join international or-
ganizations. 9 The Covenant required the people of the Marianas to
formulate a Constitution which provides for a republican form of
government, with separate executive, judicial, and legislative
branches, and a bill of rights.9 7 The CNMI Constitution was ap-
proved by referendum on March 6, 1977.98 Together, the Covenant
and the Constitution provide CNMI with a status unique in the
United States: greater self-government than previous U.S. territo-
ries, but less autonomy than freely associated states.9
The basic structure settled upon falls within the range for auton-
90. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Po-
litical Union With the United States, Feb. 15, 1975, H.R.J. Res. 549, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), S.J. Res. 107, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263
(1976)("Covenant").
91. See Recent Developments, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 204, 207 (1977).
92. Covenant, supra note 90.
93. Sen. Rep. No. 596, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 448, 455 ("The Administration considers that the Covenant helps
fulfill American international obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Trustee-
ship Agreement"). Courts have held that the Covenant is to be considered federal law. See
Taisacan v. Camacho, 660 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1981).
94. Covenant, supra note 90, Preamble.
95. Id. art. I, § 101, and art. 111, § 301; see generally Com. of Northern Mariana
Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 1984).
96. Id. art. VI, § 603; art. V, § 503; art. IX, § 904(c).
97. Id. art. 11, §§ 201, 203.
98. Willens & Seimer, The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands: Constitu-
tional Principles and Innovation in a Pacific Setting, 65 GEO. L.J. 1373, 1387 (1977).
99. See Atalig, supra note 95, at 685 n.5, 687.
[Vol. 20
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 [1989], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol20/iss1/6
POST-1997 HONG KONG
omous entities. The Governor and Legislature are locally elected. 100
Judges are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent
of the Legislature.'' The Legislative power extends "to all rightful
subjects of legislation,"'1 2 and the U.S. has no veto power over leg-
islation: CNMI may amend its constitution without approval of the
U.S."0 3 The judicial power vested in the local courts is similar to
that provided to the several states of the United States, with U.S.
District Court jurisdiction in federal matters, and appeals from fi-
nal decisions of the CNMI highest court allowed only where issues
are raised relating to the federal constitution, laws, or treaties."0 "
The crucial issues in negotiating the terms of the Covenant were
limiting application of the United States Constitution and restrict-
ing federal legislative authority over CNMI. CNMI is culturally
and geographically distinct from the United States and the people
of the Marianas wished to have more protection from federal inter-
ference than that accorded to Guam, Puerto Rico, American Sa-
moa, and the Virgin Islands. They were partially successful in
achieving this goal. Article V of the Covenant lists the individual
provisions of the U.S. Constitution which apply to CNMI. Those
provisions of the U.S. Constitution not listed have no effect in
CNMI.'0 5 Article V further adds that other provisions of the U.S.
Constitution "will be applicable within the Northern Mariana Is-
lands only with approval of the Government of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands and the Government of the United States."'16 As a re-
sult of Article V, the CNMI Constitution contains provisions which
directly violate the U.S. Constitution.'7
A similar approach was used to designate in the Covenant which
existing federal laws would apply to the CNMI and which would
not.'08 A provision in the Covenant created a Commission consist-
100. Covenant, supra note 90, art. 11, § 203(b) and (c).
101. CNMI CONST. art. IV, § 4.
102. Id. art. I1, § 1.
103. Covenant, supra note 90, art. 11, § 202. There is an indirect review in the sense
that U.S. courts may determine in a given case whether an amendment is consistent with the
Covenant and applicable U.S. laws. Id.
104. Id. art. IV, § 402. The Covenant provides for a brief transition period during
which the U.S. District Court will continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
105. Fleming v. Dept. of Public Safety, 837 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1988).
106. Covenant, supra note 90, art. V, § 501(a).
107. See generally Willens, supra note 98 (non-proportional voting and restrictions on
land alienation violate U.S. Constitution); Branch, The Constitution of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands: Does a Different Cultural Setting Justify Different Constitutional Standards?,
9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35 (1980); see also Atalig, supra note 95 (6th Amendment right
to jury trial of U.S. Constitution does not apply to CNMI).
108. Covenant, supra note 90, art. V, §§ 502 and 503.
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ing of seven members, comprised of at least four persons from
CNMI, to survey the laws of the U.S. and report to Congress
which laws should and should not apply. 10 9 The Commission was to
"take into consideration the potential effect of each law on local
conditions within the Northern Mariana Islands[.]" 0 The Commis-
sion was required to issue a final report within one year of the ter-
mination of the Trusteeship.
Finally, the Covenant contains a provision limiting the future ex-
ercise of federal legislative power. The Territorial Clause of the
U.S. Constitution gives the federal government broad discretion
and power over territories.' Representatives of the Marianas
"questioned whether the principle of maximum self-government
could be reconciled with the plenary powers of Congress under the
Territorial Clause.""' 2 Initially, the U.S. opposed any limitation on
federal power, arguing that as a practical matter the federal gov-
ernment had seldom interfered in the internal affairs of the territo-
ries."' The compromise they settled upon was mutual consent,
whereby fundamental provisions of the Covenant "may be modified
through federal legislation only with the consent" of both govern-
ments."" This is a unique limitation on the power of Congress
under the Territorial Clause, the significance of which is more ap-
parent when one considers that the Covenant is merely a federal
statute..In effect, Congress enacted a statute which limits its ability
to directly or indirectly amend the statute in the future, by requir-
ing the approval of an outside entity. The express purpose of this
extraordinary limitation is to respect the Marianas' right of self-
government, 5 or more specifically, the Marianas' right to be free
from interference.
IV. CNMI AND HONG KONG
The differences between CNMI and Hong Kong are so evident
that comparison initially seems nonsensical. Nonetheless, there are
obvious similarities. Like CNMI, on the continuum of autonomous
entitles, Hong Kong falls in an intermediate status between a terri-
109. Id. art. V, § 504.
110. Id.
111. Leibowitz, The Marianas Covenant Negotiations, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 19, 23,
(1981).
112. Id. at 26.
113. Id. at 27.
114. Covenant, supra note 90, art. 1, § 105.
115. Id.
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tory and an associated state. Both CNMI and Hong Kong are in
danger of being overwhelmed by their association with a dominant
central government which has very different traditions. They both
rely upon two related documents, one in the form of an agreement
and the other a "constitution," to set up their government structure
and to define their relationship with the central government. Per-
haps they are most alike in their fear of central government inter-
ference in internal affairs. The United States and the PRC also
shared certain characteristics in their approach to the problem.
Both were willing to allow a limited degree of autonomy, primarily
internal self-government. However, the relationship had to exist co-
herently within their own constitutional scheme with ultimate con-
trol clearly in the central government. Both the U.S. and the PRC
approached the respective negotiations with an adversarial attitude,
hoping to concede only what must be conceded. They shared the
concern that if too much was given other similar regions less well
off would agitate for equal treatment. Considering this confluence
of fears and motivations, it is not surprising that similar issues were
faced. At least in response to one problem a similar approach has
already been taken. In both instances, the national laws to be ap-
plied to the autonomous region were surveyed by a Committee and
explicity listed.
The PRC and Hong Kong will benefit by examining the way the
U.S. and CNMI dealt with the difficult issue of allowing certain
violations of the U.S. Constitution in CNMI. Many commentators
have observed that Hong Kong's capitalist economic system will vi-
olate the requirement in the PRC Constitution of a socialist eco-
nomic system. Setting out in the Basic Law which provisions of the
PRC Constitution would not apply to Hong Kong (or setting out
those which would apply) will help clarify the boundaries of the
relationship, will avoid future disputes, and will provide greater se-
curity to Hong Kong.
Most important, however, is the compromise made by the U.S.
and CNMI on the restriction of federal legislative power to amend
the Covenant. As argued in an earlier section, the greatest danger
to Hong Kong's internal self-government is the PRC's power to
unilaterally amend the Basic Law. Although such amendments
cannot violate the Joint Declaration, the Declaration is bare and in
many respects ambiguous, allowing the PRC substantial flexibility.
The PRC also has the power under international law to amend the
Joint Declaration with Britain's consent, regardless of the wishes of
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Hong Kong. However, practically speaking, Britain would probably
consider the interests of Hong Kong. In contrast, the United States
has no power to amend CNMI's Constitution and may not modify
fundamental provisions of the Covenant without CNMI's consent.
Because the underlying circumstances were different, the Covenant
is not directly parallel to the Joint Declaration, and the Basic Law
is not directly parallel to CNMI's Constitution. The Joint Declara-
tion served as a brief outline to be filled in by the Basic Law on
both the political relationship and internal matters. The Covenant
focused more in depth on the political relationship, and the CNMI
Constitution deals exclusively with internal matters. On the critical
element, national legislative power, the Covenant is actually com-
parable to the Basic Law. Both the Covenant and the Basic Law
are statutes enacted by the respective central governments. As
such, each of these statutes are linked to the exercise of sovereign
legislative power, which gives the central government the inherent
right to unilaterally change the fundamental base of the autono-
mous entity.
The Marianas and the United States (albeit the latter only after
insistence of the former) recognized that true autonomy could not
exist under this condition. Self-government and non-interference
would be precarious in the absence of some restraint more concrete
than assurances of good faith. To resolve this problem, the parties
identified the fundamental provisions of the Covenant: those setting
out the political relationship, the internal structure of the CNMI
government, and citizenship, and those limiting the application of
federal laws and the federal constitution. These provisions are nec-
essary to insure self-government, and were set apart as untouchable
by the federal government without consent of CNMI. All other
provisions of the Covenant can be modified by the U.S. in the same
manner any statute is subject to modification.
The application of this compromise to the PRC's power to unilat-
erally amend the Basic Law is obvious. The fundamental provisions
of the Basic Law should be identified, including those on general
principles, political relationship, fundamental rights, and political
structure. The controlling principle should be identification of those
provisions essential to self-government, and the PRC should explic-
itly give up its power to amend these provisions without first ob-
taining the consent of the government of Hong Kong. All provisions
not so identified may be amended by the PRC as it would any other
statute.
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The PRC would not be giving up much in terms of Scope because
the provisions set aside will inevitably coincide with the basic provi-
sions of the Joint Declaration, which the PRC also cannot unilater-
ally amend. Thus, the PRC would restrict its power to change the
Basic Law to the extent that the law fills in the gaps of the Joint
Declaration in the areas of self-government. However, the bounda-
ries of what the PRC may unilaterally control would not be af-
fected. The benefit to Hong Kong would be great, both psychologi-
cal and concrete, giving the people a sense of stability and control
over the very foundation of their government and separate exis-
tence, and that most important of intangibles, they would have a
say that matters. Foremost, the principle of non-interference would
be given effect.
CONCLUSION
It would be rather easy to take apart the draft Basic Law section
by section and to suggest changes that would make Hong Kong
more autonomous. The difficulty comes in offering support for the
changes based on reasons other than philosophical objection to the
PRC's political and economic system, and sympathy for Hong
Kong's plight. Too much of the opposition to date has come from
this direction. What is needed is a more balanced analysis which
takes into account the legitimate interests of the PRC as well as the
fears of Hong Kong. This paper has attempted to take a more bal-
anced approach by measuring the draft Basic Law and the Joint
Declaration against other models of autonomy to lend some mean-
ing from external sources to the crucial phrase "high degree of au-
tonomy." A high degree, by definition, is a relative concept, which
can be understood only by comparing what is intended in a particu-
lar situation with what exists in other situations. Once a standard is
identified, a more productive evaluation of the merits of each side
can occur. Another value of comparison is the discovery that simi-
lar problems have previously been dealt with in ways which may be
of some use.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this paper is the sugges-
tion that the PRC's assertion of power to interpret the Basic Law,
within the limits proposed, is legitimate. The paper also suggests
that the PRC's power to amend the Basic Law, within limits, is
legitimate. The key to this analysis, of course, is the limits, which
are based on the principle of non-interference. To be effective, any
suggestion must be acceptable to the parties involved in the context
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in which it is to be applied. Therefore, this paper has taken a
quintessentially Asian approach: pragmatic compromise.
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